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习安会前景

拉尔夫科萨 美国国际与战略研究中心太平洋论坛总裁  2014年12月18日

【摘要】 钓鱼岛问题是中日两国能否实现首脑会晤的主要障碍。只要彼此都愿意争取双赢的结果,两国共同重新搁置争议仍然是有空间的。东京方面可以承认钓鱼岛存在争议,北京方面可以承认钓鱼岛处于东京的实际管辖下。安倍晋三可以在出访北京前发表声明,表示钓鱼岛处在日本行政管辖下,但日本放弃使用武力解决领土争端,并敦促中国进行类似的表态。


 

全世界仍在猜测习近平和安倍晋三是否能够在亚太经合组织领导人会议期间进行有意义的会谈。截至到目前为止,两国唯一能确保的是双方会在会议期间握手。两国都承认有会面的意愿,但是中国已经明确表示两国元首的正式会面只有在“合适的氛围下”才会发生。北京方面已经明确提出了这些“氛围”的含义:第一,安倍晋三必须承诺不再参拜供奉了14名第二次世界大战甲级战犯的靖国神社;第二,东京方面承认由日本实际控制,但中国(包括台湾)也声索主权的钓鱼岛存在争议。

安倍晋三已经明确表示作为首相不可能明确表示不参拜靖国神社,但他的许多特使已经向中国方面私下表示,安倍将在未来的参拜问题上非常谨慎。如果这是真的话,华盛顿和首尔方面也会感到非常高兴。安倍晋三2013年12月参拜靖国神社的行为引发华盛顿方面公开表示“失望”,来自北京和首尔的反应更加激烈。

岛屿争端问题更大。在一个法律意见超越战略思维的时代,没有领导人愿意承认一国实际控制下的领土是存在争议的。北京方面尽管坚持认为东京方面需要承认东海岛屿存在争端,但在南沙群岛的问题上却坚持不存在领土争端,坚持认为九段线内的所有岛屿、礁石、岩礁都是中国无可争议的领土。与之相类似,俄罗斯和韩国也都认为北方四岛和独岛是毫无争议的领土,即使东京方面也对这两处岛屿主张主权(莫斯科最开始还愿意和日本就此问题进行讨论,不过随后发生的乌克兰危机使得安倍和普京的峰会变得没有希望)。

在钓鱼岛的问题上,中国坚持认为两国曾在20世纪70年代达成过搁置争议的协议,共同同意把这一问题交给下一代解决。北京方面表示只要东京方面承认争议,那么他们愿意重新搁置争议。北京还批评日本方面在2012年国有化三个岛屿的行为,并称这是所有问题的根源。然而,东京方面认为中国自2010年开始更加频繁地派遣渔船在政府船只的护卫下进入相关海域,包括2010年9月日本海警船和喝醉了中国船长指挥下的渔船相撞。日本还认为,2012年国有化三座岛屿的行为是为了维持而非改变现状,国有化钓鱼岛的行为对避免钓鱼岛落入极右翼民族主义分子的手上是必要的,这些极右翼分子已经开始在一些无人居住的岛屿上建筑设施。事实上在2012年之前,钓鱼岛5座岛屿中的4座处于私人手中,而还有一个处于日本政府控制下。现在,4座岛屿由政府控制,还有1座在私人手中。相应的比例发生了变化,但是整体状态没有变化。所有5座岛屿过去就处在日本行政管辖下,现在也处在日本行政管辖下。

尽管如此,只要彼此都愿意争取双赢的结果,两国共同重新搁置争议仍然是有空间的。东京方面可以承认钓鱼岛存在争议,北京方面可以承认钓鱼岛处于东京的实际管辖下。

我建议安倍晋三在出发去北京前做出如下声明:“日本政府认识到这一地区及全世界都存在许多领土争端,日本已经决定放弃使用武力解决这一地区的领土争端,同时也敦促地区内国家表现相同的克制。我们相信北方四岛和独岛都属于日本,但认识到现在他们正处在俄罗斯和韩国的行政管辖下。我们必须和平解决这一问题而不使用或威胁使用武力。我们也认识到中华人民共和国声称钓鱼岛是中国领土,但呼吁北京方面承认这些岛屿正毫无争议地处于日本的行政管辖下,放弃使用或威胁使用武力处理这一问题。我们敦促北京方面回到邓小平搁置争议的处理模式中。

随后,北京方面可以将安倍的声明视为承认争议,也承认过去两国间达成过协议。中国可以欢迎安倍的声明是搁置争议的第一步,同意就地区内的渔业权等具体议题进行讨论(如日本和台湾地区已经达成的协议)。这将为习安峰会打开一扇门,双方可以讨论一些更加宏观的问题,而不仅仅是这些有争议的岛屿。

此外,这样的声明也能安抚别国,日本不会使用武力解决独岛问题。人们也许希望首尔方面能够关注到这一声明的积极方面而非对主权的主张。青瓦台可以表示:“在韩国看来,独岛毫无争议是韩国的领土,但是我们欢迎安倍首相承认独岛处于韩国的控制之下,也欢迎日本致力于和平解决争端的态度。我们敦促所有国家在东海和南海的领土争端中体现相同的克制。”这将为北京施加压力,遵循日本的例子,在钓鱼岛和南海问题上保持克制。


 

 

Xi-Abe: Will They or Won’t They?


Ralph Cossa


The guessing game continues as to whether there will be a meaningful discussion between Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and Chinese President Xi Jinping along the sidelines of next week’s APEC Leaders Meeting in Beijing. So far, a handshake is about the only thing the two sides are willing to guarantee. Both sides profess a willingness to meet, but China has made it clear that an extended conversation can only occur “under the right conditions.” These conditions have been clearly spelled out by Beijing: first, a pledge by Abe to stop visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine which honors, among 2.5 million others, the spirits of 14 World War Two “Class A” war criminals; and second, an acknowledgment by Tokyo that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, occupied and administered by Japan but claimed by China (and Taiwan), are indeed disputed territory.

 

The Abe administration has made it clear that the prime minister, as a matter of conscience, is not prepared to publicly announce that he will forego future visits to Yasukuni, but several of his emissaries have reportedly provided private assurances to the Chinese that he would in fact refrain from future visits. Washington and Seoul would be equally pleased if this was true. Abe’s visit to the Shrine in December 2013 resulted in a public expression of “disappointment” from Washington and considerably stronger admonitions from Beijing and Seoul.

 

The island dispute is more problematic. In an era when legal opinions trump strategic thinking, no leader seems prepared to acknowledge the existence of a dispute over territory currently under his nation’s control. Beijing, while insisting that Tokyo admit a dispute exists over the East China Sea islands, is equally adamant that no dispute exists when it comes to the Paracels (seized by China from Vietnam by force in 1974), while claiming that all islands, reefs, and rocks within their infamous nine-dashed lines in the South China Sea are “indisputably” Chinese territory. Likewise, the Russians and South Koreans claim, respectively, that the so-called Northern Territories (southern Kuriles) and Dokdo (called Takeshima by Japan) are indisputably theirs, even though Tokyo lays claim to both. (Moscow in the past has at least been willing to discuss the issue with Tokyo, although the current Ukraine situation has made an Abe-Putin Summit to discuss this issue a nonstarter.)

 

When it comes to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese claim that the two nations agreed in the 1970s to shelve the dispute for future generations to resolve; Beijing says it would like to put the issue back on the shelf (once Tokyo acknowledges the dispute). Beijing also blames the nationalization of three of the islands in 2012 as the source of the current problem. However, Tokyo argues that Chinese fishing boats and government escorts have been increasingly assertive in the East China Sea since 2010, culminating in the ramming of a Japanese Coast Guard ship by a drunken Chinese fishing boat captain in September of that year. It further argues (with some justification) that the 2012 nationalization of three of the islands was aimed at preserving, not changing the status quo and that the purchase was necessary to keep the islands out of the hands of right-wing nationalists who would have started erecting structures on the currently vacant islands. In truth, prior to 2012, four of the five islands were in private Japanese hands and one was under government control. Now, four are owned by the government and one is private; the ratio changed but the overall status did not; all five were under Japanese administrative control before and all remain under Japanese administrative control now.

 

Despite all the above, a grand bargain is possible which would allow both sides to put the issue back on the shelf, assuming both are willing to accept a win-win solution that trades a de facto admission by Japan that the islands are in dispute for an acknowledgment by Beijing that the islands are today under Tokyo’s administrative control.

 

I would suggest that Prime Minster Abe, prior to going to APEC, make the following statement: “The government of Japan recognizes that many territorial disputes exist in our region and around the world. Japan has foresworn the use of force in settling such disputes and we call on our neighbors to show the same level of restraint. We believe that both the Northern Territories and Takeshima/Dokdo rightfully belong to Japan but acknowledge that they are today under the control of Russia and the ROK respectively and that we must peacefully resolve these dispute without the use or threatened use of force. We also recognize that the PRC believes, in our view without grounds, that the Senkakus, which the Chinese refer to as the Diaoyu Islands, are Chinese territory but we call on Beijing to likewise acknowledge and respect the fact that they are today clearly and indisputably under Japanese administrative control and to renounce the use or threaten use of force in dealing with this issue. We urge Beijing to follow the example of Deng Xiaoping and place this issue back on the shelf for future generations to resolve.”

 

Beijing could then choose to interpret the Abe statement as an acknowledgment that a dispute and prior agreement both exist and welcome Prime Minister Abe’s statement as an important first step in shelving the dispute, while agreeing to open up discussions on sharing fishing rights in the area (as Japan has already done with Taiwan). This opens the door for a Xi-Abe Summit to talk about larger issues, rather than a few disputed islands.

 

As an added benefit, such a statement would provide additional reassurance that Japan will not use force against Dokdo. One would hope that Seoul would focus on the positive parts of this message and not the repeated sovereignty claim. An appropriate Blue House response would be to state that “In the ROK’s opinion, Dokdo is indisputably Korean territory but we applaud Prime Minister Abe’s acknowledgment that the islands are under ROK control and his nation’s continued commitment to a peaceful resolution of disputes. We urge all parties to show similar restraint in dealing with territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea.” This would put additional pressure on Beijing to follow Japan’s example and refrain from confrontational actions at sea around the Senkakus/Diaoyu and hopefully in the South China Sea as well.


 

 


 
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